Yes, Big Tech should do more to limit Russian military use

I welcome Katharine Khamhaengwong’s thoughtful engagement with my paper ‘The Cloud of War: How Russian Military Mobile Applications Exploit Western Tech in the War Against Ukraine’. Her critique, in Binding Hook’s Hooked! newsletter, raises important ethical, strategic, and practical questions that deserve serious discussion. However, I would like to clarify several points where her interpretation could benefit from additional context or where the complexities are greater than her summary suggests.

Proportionality and geofencing

Khamhaengwong argues that measures like geofencing and access restrictions risk harming civilians and independent developers alongside military users. I fully agree that proportionality is essential in any response. My paper does not advocate indiscriminate geofencing at the national level. Rather, I define high-threat areas as regions engaged in unlawful acts of military aggression and propose targeted measures focused on military-relevant ecosystems, developer communities tied to aggressive war efforts, and applications designed for military use. The aim is precision, not punishment of ordinary citizens. The analogy with existing industry measures against globally condemned criminal activity – like child exploitation or terrorist propaganda – demonstrates that nuanced, proactive intervention is possible.

Risk of strengthening authoritarian control

It is true that greater decoupling from Western technology could align with Russia’s ambitions for a sovereign ‘RuNet’ – a state-controlled, isolated Russian internet infrastructure. However, my recommendations are intended to raise the cost and complexity for Russian military developers, forcing reliance on inferior or fragmented domestic alternatives. This would degrade military effectiveness rather than strengthen authoritarian resilience. While Khamhaengwong’s concern is valid, it overlooks the immediate operational benefits of disrupting military use of superior Western infrastructure. The Russian state has long struggled to replicate the quality and interoperability of the global services exploited by its military applications.

Taking sides and tech neutrality

Khamhaengwong asks whether Big Tech should take sides in all conflicts and who should decide when action is warranted. This is indeed a vital debate. However, in this case, we are not discussing abstract neutrality – we are addressing a war of aggression condemned by the United Nations and much of the world. My paper does not propose that technology firms act as arbiters in every conflict, but that they take reasonable steps in clear-cut cases of illegal war where their infrastructure is being exploited for military advantage.

Feasibility of selective controls

Finally, Khamhaengwong questions whether the proactive measures I propose are achievable. I believe they are. If companies can build systems to identify and remove content related to universally illegal acts like child exploitation or terrorist propaganda, they can also develop criteria for detecting military applications originating from aggressor states. This would not require perfect solutions from day one, but rather an incremental, accountable process involving independent oversight and collaboration with international bodies.

The USGS example

The commentary’s reference to the removal of data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) database under political turbulence in the United States appears only loosely connected to my argument. My call is for intentional, ethical governance of technology platforms, not for the uncoordinated disappearance of public resources in response to shifting political contexts.

Conclusion

I appreciate Khamhaengwong’s reminder that these questions are difficult and require balancing security, ethics, and openness. My intention is not to propose easy fixes, but to encourage a necessary dialogue about the responsibilities of technology providers in an age when infrastructure can be exploited for unlawful military aggression. Ukraine cannot wait for these conversations to mature while its people face daily attacks. It is time for proactive, principled action to ensure technology serves peace – not aggression.